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ABSTRACT 
  The Supreme Court has long recognized that prisoners’ 
constitutional rights must be balanced against the need for deference 
to the decisions of prison administrators when prisoners’ rights are 
restricted incident to their incarceration. The Court, however, has 
never explicitly recognized a theory of proper incarceration, yet it has 
implicitly adopted such a theory through its decisions regarding the 
constitutionally permitted level of restriction on particular prisoners’ 
rights. This Note argues that the Court’s prisoners’ rights 
jurisprudence evinces a particular definition of proper incarceration 
and then reads the multiple opinions in Beard v. Banks consistently 
with that theory. 
INTRODUCTION 
“The United States has considerably more violent crime and 
vastly more punishment than any other prosperous democracy.”1 
“There has been a fivefold increase in the number of incarcerated 
individuals over the last thirty years.”2 “In 2006, over 7.2 million 
people were on probation, in jail or prison, or on parole” in the 
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 1. CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 21 (John Kaplan et al. eds., 5th ed. 2004). 
 2. Ben Geiger, Comment, The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CAL. 
L. REV. 1191, 1194 (2006). 
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United States.3 As of December 2006, 2,258,983 individuals were 
incarcerated in the United States,4 roughly five out of every one 
thousand Americans.5 For certain segments of the population, the 
statistics are far bleaker. At the end of 2006, 3.04 percent of black 
males were prison inmates, compared with 1.26 percent of Hispanic 
males and 0.49 percent of white males.6 
Such incarceration has been justified primarily by two theories: 
  What we may call the retributive view is that punishment is 
justified on the grounds that wrongdoing merits punishment. It is 
morally fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer in 
proportion to his wrongdoing. That a criminal should be punished 
follows from his guilt, and the severity of the appropriate 
punishment depends on the depravity of his act. The state of affairs 
where a wrongdoer suffers punishment is morally better than the 
state of affairs where he does not; and it is better irrespective of any 
of the consequences of punishing him. 
  What we may call the utilitarian view holds that on the principle 
that bygones are bygones and that only future consequences are 
material to present decisions, punishment is justifiable only by 
reference to the probable consequences of maintaining it as one of 
the devices of the social order. Wrongs committed in the past are, as 
such, not relevant considerations for deciding what to do. If 
punishment can be shown to promote effectively the interest of 
society it is justifiable, otherwise it is not.7 
The American system of incarceration is based on these two theories, 
and the states along with prison administrators often tailor 
incarceration in their jurisdictions to further these goals. 
“Determinations about the nature and purposes of punishment 
for criminal acts implicate difficult and enduring questions respecting 
the sanctity of the individual, the nature of law, and the relation 
 
 3. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Corrections Statistics, http:// 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/correct.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2007). 
 4. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison Statistics, http://www. 
ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2007). 
 5. See id. (“[T]here were an estimated 501 prison inmates per 100,000 U.S. 
Residents . . . .”). 
 6. See id. (“At yearend 2006 there were 3,042 black male sentenced prison inmates per 
100,000 black males in the United States, compared to 1,261 Hispanic male inmates per 100,000 
Hispanic males and 487 white male inmates per 100,000 white males.”). 
 7. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4–5 (1955). 
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between law and the social order.”8 The “penological goals of 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation”9 can justify 
a variety of legitimate penological schemes, “[a]nd the responsibility 
for making these fundamental choices and implementing them lies 
with the legislature.”10 Furthermore, “the fixing of prison terms for 
specific crimes involves a substantive penological judgment that, as a 
general matter, is ‘properly within the province of legislatures, not 
courts.’”11 Thus, “reviewing courts . . . should grant substantial 
deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess 
in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes.”12 
Notwithstanding this deference to legislatures, the Court has set 
some limits on the types of constitutionally acceptable punishment. 
“[A] prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections 
when he is imprisoned for crime,”13 and he does “not forfeit all 
constitutional protections by reason of [his] conviction and 
confinement” alone.14 The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel 
and unusual punishment protects prisoners,15 but their constitutional 
protections do not stop there.16 The Court explained, “[O]ur cases 
have held that sentenced prisoners enjoy freedom of speech and 
religion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, . . . [and] they 
are protected against invidious discrimination on the basis of race 
under the Equal Protection Clause.”17 Finally, “they may claim the 
protection of the Due Process Clause to prevent additional 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”18 
Although “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison 
 
 8. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 9. Id. at 999. 
 10. Id. at 998. 
 11. Id. (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275–76 (1980)). 
 12. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983). 
 13. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974). 
 14. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 545 (1979)). 
 15. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 16. But see Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2582–83 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (arguing that legislatures and prison officials constitutionally have the ability to 
define punishment in any way that does not exceed the limits of the Eighth Amendment). 
 17. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 545 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 
U.S. 319 (1972); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964)). 
 18. Id. at 545 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 539). 
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inmates from the protections of the Constitution,”19 “the Constitution 
sometimes permits greater restriction of such rights in a prison than it 
would allow elsewhere.”20 
Prisoners’ retention of their constitutional rights and their ability 
to appeal to courts for protection are of particular importance given 
their place in society. Incarcerated criminal offenders “constitute a 
despised minority without political power to influence the policies of 
legislative and executive officials.”21 Prisoners are “routinely and 
permanently disenfranchised.”22 As “‘constitutional outsiders’ replete 
with . . . ‘spoiled identities,’”23 prisoners lack the ability to affect the 
legislature during their imprisonment when prison regulations 
deprive them of life, liberty, and property and often do not regain 
that ability upon release from prison.24 
In prisoners’ rights cases, the Supreme Court has historically 
balanced this need for protection of the rights of politically powerless 
prisoners with the need for deference to legislatures and prison 
administrators.25 In balancing these ideals, however, the Court has 
refused to find that the adoption of any particular penological theory 
is mandated by the Constitution26 and has left the difficult task of 
dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison 
 
 19. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). This language was also used by the Court in 
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989), and by the concurrence in Overton v. Bazzetta, 
539 U.S. 126, 137 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring). The Court has similarly stated that “[t]here is 
no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.” McDonnell, 
418 U.S. at 555–56. 
 20. Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2577–78 (plurality opinion). 
 21. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 292 (2d ed. 
1997). 
 22. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 441, 459 (1999). Many states permanently disenfranchise felons. Id. The Supreme Court 
accepted the constitutionality of this practice in Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), 
upholding a California law permanently disenfranchising all felons. Id. at 56. 
 23. James E. Robertson, The Jurisprudence of the PLRA: Inmates as “Outsiders” and the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 198 (2001). 
 24. See id. (“[I]nmates had nary a voice in the legislative debate over the proposed 
legislation.”). This is because they are disenfranchised. Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 459; see 
also Geiger, supra note 2, at 1191 (“Ex-offenders are often legally disenfranchised.”). 
 25. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (“Traditionally, federal courts 
have adopted a broad hands-off attitude towards problems of prison administration. . . . [T]his 
attitude springs from . . . perceptions about the nature of the problems and efficacy of judicial 
intervention. . . . But a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take 
cognizance of valid constitutional claims . . . .”). 
 26. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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administration to prison administrators themselves.27 It has also 
declined to craft a theory of proper incarceration, but has 
nevertheless found that some rights are “inconsistent with proper 
incarceration.”28 
This Note argues that despite the Court’s explicit claims to the 
contrary, it has in fact created and implemented an ascertainable 
theory of proper incarceration through its prisoners’ rights cases. It 
also argues that the Court’s decision in Beard v. Banks29 should be 
read in a way that is consistent with this theory and should represent 
further development of this theory in the realm of deprivations for 
rehabilitation. Part I outlines the broader legal history of prisoners’ 
rights cases, with a particular focus on Turner v. Safley,30 which 
provided the balancing test used in Banks. Part II discusses the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Beard v. Banks. Finally, Part III analyzes 
the test for determining the constitutionality of restrictions on 
prisoners’ rights and the proper amount of deference to be given 
prison administrators. This Part interprets the theory of proper 
incarceration implicitly developed and implemented by the Court and 
locates within Banks a way to further develop that theory consistent 
with precedent. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The Court has sought to balance the rights retained by prisoners 
with the goals of effective and efficient prison administration through 
its prisoners’ rights jurisprudence. It has tried to maintain meaningful 
judicial review while deferring to the legislature and prison officials to 
set and administer prison policy. Initially, the Court’s cases lacked a 
coherent standard for reviewing prisoners’ rights claims and balancing 
 
 27. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 404–05. 
 28. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510–11 (2005) (applying strict scrutiny instead 
of the deferential Turner standard because the Court has “applied Turner’s reasonable 
relationship test only to rights that are ‘inconsistent with proper incarceration’”). The majority 
in Johnson did not explicitly refuse to determine what proper incarceration should entail; 
instead it decided the case without crafting any theory of proper incarceration because it found 
equal protection was not inconsistent with proper incarceration. Id. at 510–11, 515. Justice 
Thomas, however, argued in his dissent that by inquiring whether equal protection was 
consistent with proper prison administration, the majority in fact impermissibly substituted its 
conception of proper incarceration for that of the prison officials. Id. at 541–43 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). For a definition of the term “theory of proper incarceration” and an explanation of 
the Court’s theory, see infra Part III.A. 
 29. Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006). 
 30. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
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these concerns. Then, in Turner v. Safley, the Court developed the 
reasonable relationship test to clear up confusion and provide for a 
single standard. Over time, however, numerous standards again 
developed to deal with specific prisoners’ rights claims. The Court’s 
prisoners’ rights jurisprudence culminated in its decision in Beard v. 
Banks, upholding a prison policy of depriving prisoners of 
constitutional rights to encourage better behavior and promote 
rehabilitation.31 
This Part outlines the progression of the Court’s prisoners’ rights 
jurisprudence by tracing early prisoners’ rights law, examining the 
Court’s decision in Turner and the state of prisoners’ rights post-
Turner, and discussing the cases following Turner that provide the 
immediate context for the Court’s decision in Banks. 
A. Identifying the Problem: The Pre-Turner Cases 
In the Court’s early cases dealing with claims of prisoners’ rights, 
the absence of a clear standard and test created a landscape of 
jurisprudence which was confusing and difficult to navigate. First, in 
Procunier v. Martinez,32 the Court framed the analysis by requiring 
the federal courts to take cognizance of prisoners’ constitutional 
claims and later explained that “prison walls do not form a barrier 
separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.”33 
It examined broad prison policies requiring censorship of incoming 
and outgoing mail and prohibiting the use of law students and other 
paraprofessionals to conduct attorney-client interviews.34 Though the 
question was framed as whether the First Amendment applied in 
prison, the Court found it unnecessary to answer that question 
because it found the regulations impinged unconstitutionally on the 
rights of those not imprisoned.35 The Court based its decision on 
judicial restraint and recognized that courts are ill-equipped to deal 
with the complex problems posed by the modern prison system.36 It 
 
 31. Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2578–79 (plurality opinion). 
 32. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). 
 33. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84–85 (citing Martinez, 416 U.S. at 404–06). 
 34. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 398–400. 
 35. Id. at 408 (“Whatever the status of a prisoner’s claim to uncensored correspondence 
with an outsider, it is plain that the latter’s interest is grounded in the First Amendment’s 
guarantee of freedom of speech. And this does not depend on whether the nonprisoner 
correspondent is the author or intended recipient of a particular letter . . . .”). 
 36. Id. at 404–05 (“[T]he problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, 
more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require 
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noted, however, that “a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass 
any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims . . . . 
When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental 
constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to 
protect constitutional rights.”37 Thus, it left unresolved the standard of 
review for prisoners’ constitutional claims in light of those conflicting 
interests.38 
Three other cases attempted to deal with prisoners’ rights issues 
within the Martinez framework but failed to create any coherent 
standard.39 In Pell v. Procunier,40 the Court upheld a California prison 
policy prohibiting face-to-face media interviews with prisoners41 on 
the ground that prisoners had alternative ways of exercising their 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to communication.42 In 
balancing the interests framed in Martinez, the Court deferred to 
prison officials’ judgments regarding prison security and determined 
that unless their actions were an exaggerated response to concerns of 
prison security, the Court would rely on the expertise of prison 
officials in judgments about prison policies.43 
In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc.,44 the 
Court balanced the need for deference to prison officials when 
dealing with urgent problems of prison administration with the fact 
that prisoners retain rights not inconsistent with their status as 
prisoners.45 Because allowing the “development of informal 
organizations [would] threaten the core functions of prison 
administration, maintaining safety and internal security,”46 the Court 
in North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union upheld the policy 
 
expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly 
within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government.”). 
 37. Id. at 405–06. 
 38. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 85 (“Martinez did not itself resolve the question that it 
framed.”). 
 39. See id. at 85–89 (discussing the opinions after Martinez leading up to Turner). 
 40. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
 41. Id. at 821–22. 
 42. Id. at 825–26. The availability of alternative means of exercising the restricted right was 
later incorporated into the Turner test. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (“A second factor relevant in 
determining the reasonableness of a prison restriction, as Pell shows, is whether there are 
alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.”). 
 43. Turner, 482 U.S. at 86 (citing Pell, 417 U.S. at 827). 
 44. Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977). 
 45. Id. at 129–32. 
 46. Turner, 482 U.S. at 92 (citing N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. at 125). 
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prohibiting prisoner labor unions and restricting associational rights 
as central and therefore rationally related to the objectives of prison 
administration.47 
Finally, in Bell v. Wolfish,48 the Court upheld a prison policy 
permitting inmates to receive hardcover books only when sent 
directly from the publisher, book club, or bookstore.49 Prison 
administrators justified this “publisher-only” rule as a means of 
avoiding “‘serious’ security and administrative problems.”50 The 
Court noted that the restriction was neutral and that the inmates 
retained alternative means of exercising their First Amendment 
rights.51 Ultimately the Court found this was “a rational response by 
prison officials to an obvious security problem,” and absent 
prohibitions far more sweeping than those here, the considered 
judgment of prison officials would prevail.52 
These four cases did not provide a consistent standard to 
determine the constitutionality of restrictions on the rights of 
prisoners. Though Martinez framed the analysis by requiring a 
balance of prisoners’ rights with deference to prison administrators,53 
in Pell, North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, and Wolfish, the 
Court balanced those interests ad hoc. In each case the deciding 
factor was different. In Pell, the constitutionality of the provision 
turned on the alternative means available for prisoners to exercise 
their rights,54 but in North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, the Court 
found the prisoners’ interests were “barely implicated” because the 
need for institutional security was so high.55 And finally in Wolfish, it 
 
 47. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. at 132–33. 
 48. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
 49. Id. at 550. 
 50. Id. at 549. 
 51. Id. at 551–52. As noted, the second prong of the Turner test incorporated the 
availability of alternative means of exercising the right. See supra note 42. Similarly, neutrality 
was incorporated into the first prong of the Turner test, which requires a “valid, rational 
connection” between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put 
forward to justify it. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 
(1984)). The Court further explained that to satisfy this first prong, “the governmental objective 
must be a legitimate and neutral one.” Id. at 90 (emphasis added). 
 52. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 551. 
 53. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405–06 (1974). 
 54. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 825–26 (1974). 
 55. See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 130–33 (1977) 
(“Responsible prison officials must be permitted to take reasonable steps to forestall such . . . 
threat[s].”). 
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was the neutrality and narrowness of the provision that substantiated 
its constitutionality.56 It is in this confusing context that Turner v. 
Safley was decided, and the Court provided guidance in this area of 
law. 
B. Turner v. Safley and the Background of Deference to Prison 
Administrators 
The decision in Turner provided what was to be the sole standard 
for prisoners’ rights cases, and the Court has since declared that 
future decisions in this area should not render this powerful decision 
toothless.57 In Turner, the Supreme Court first formulated the 
reasonable relationship test for prisoners’ rights cases—a test that 
would later be applied in Banks—and laid the foundation for much of 
modern prisoners’ rights jurisprudence.58 Turner involved two prison 
policies: a regulation of correspondence between inmates in different 
institutions and a regulation severely restricting inmates’ ability to 
marry.59 The correspondence regulation permitted communication 
with inmates in other institutions only when it was between 
immediate family members or when the correspondence concerned 
legal matters.60 Otherwise, the regulation prohibited correspondence 
unless “the classification/treatment team of each inmate deem[ed] it 
in the best interest of the parties involved.”61 The marriage regulation 
allowed marriage by an inmate only when approved by the 
superintendent of the prison and provided that permission should 
only be given when there were compelling reasons to do so.62 
The Court’s opinion in Turner outlined four factors to balance in 
determining whether a regulation restricting prisoners’ rights is 
reasonable: 
First, is there a “‘valid rational connection’ between the prison 
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to 
 
 56. See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 551–53 (concluding the restriction is “limited,” in part because 
of its neutral operation and the alternatives available to prisoners). 
 57. In Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989), the Supreme Court indicated the 
importance of Turner by adopting its reasonableness standard and declaring that it is not 
“toothless.” Id. at 414. 
 58. See Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2577 (2006) (plurality opinion) (declaring Turner 
one of the cases containing “the basic substantive legal standards governing this case”). 
 59. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81–82 (1987). 
 60. Id. at 81. 
 61. Id. at 82. 
 62. Id. 
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justify it”? Second, are there “alternative means of exercising the 
right that remain open to prison inmates”? Third, what “impact” 
will “accommodation of the asserted constitutional right . . . have on 
guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources 
generally”? And, fourth, are “ready alternatives” for furthering the 
governmental interest available?63 
Applying this test, the Court upheld the correspondence 
regulation, determining that the regulation reasonably related to 
penological interests of security and safety and thus logically 
advanced those institutional goals.64 Importantly, this regulation was 
“not an exaggerated response to those objectives.”65 In contrast, the 
Court struck down the marriage regulation after applying the four-
factor test because it did not reasonably relate to the prison 
administration’s goal of rehabilitation and was too broad to serve that 
penological objective.66 The Court noted that although the prison 
could implement restrictions on the time, place, and manner of 
inmates’ marriages, it could not categorically ban marriage.67 
In striking down the marriage restriction and upholding the 
correspondence regulation, the Turner Court announced a definite 
standard and test for determining the constitutionality of rights 
restrictions in prisons.68 In announcing the four-factor balancing test, 
the Court established the Turner test as the measure of 
constitutionality for regulations restricting the rights of prisoners. 
 
 63. Banks, 126 S. Ct at 2578 (plurality opinion) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 64. Turner, 482 U.S. at 93. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. at 97–99 (explaining that though rehabilitation was a valid interest, the 
provisions were not reasonably related and that the provisions themselves were broader than 
the penological objectives stated). 
 67. See id. (explaining that prisons could certainly regulate the time and circumstances of 
the marriage ceremony for legitimate security interests but that the rule banning marriages was 
an exaggerated response to security objectives). 
 68. See id. at 89–91 (articulating the four-factor test). But see Trevor N. McFadden, Note, 
When to Turn to Turner? The Supreme Court’s Schizophrenic Prison Jurisprudence, 22 J.L. & 
POL. 135, 136 (2006) (arguing that although Turner is nominally the test for prisoners’ rights, it 
is not applied in many cases). 
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C. Testing the Limits of the Turner Test: The Post-Turner, Pre-Banks 
Cases 
In case after case, the Court turned to Turner, applying its four-
factor test to numerous questions of prisoners’ rights.69 Though it was 
for a time the exclusive test in this area,70 eventually situations began 
to arise in which the Turner test was not entirely appropriate even 
though the constitutional rights of prisoners were implicated. By 
necessity, the test was modified or rejected in those situations. 
The Court initially applied the Turner test to religious freedom 
situations in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz.71 In Estate of Shabazz, 
Muslim inmates on work detail outside the prison were prohibited 
from returning to the prison during the workday to attend Jumu’ah, 
though certain other Muslim observances remained unrestricted.72 
The Court applied the Turner test to uphold the policy, finding that it 
was justified by institutional security and rehabilitative concerns; the 
stringent time requirements for Jumu’ah made it extraordinarily 
difficult for prison administrators to ensure that each Muslim could 
attend; the Muslim prisoners retained alternative means of free 
exercise of their religion; and the accommodation of these inmates 
would have adverse effects on other inmates, prison personnel, and 
prison resources.73 After the passage of the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,74 however, the Court rejected 
the Turner test and adopted a compelling government interest 
standard for Establishment Clause cases as indicated by the statute.75 
 
 69. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361–62 (1996) (citing Turner); Washington v. 
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223–25 (1990) (same); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989) 
(same); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (same). 
 70. This point is generally accepted by both courts and academics, but an argument has 
been presented that in fact Turner is not the exclusive test for prisoners’ rights claims. See 
generally McFadden, supra note 68, at 136 (“In addition to academics, the Supreme Court itself 
suggests that Turner created a uniform, single standard of deference to prison 
administrators. . . . However, a closer examination of the Court’s jurisprudence shows that this 
generalization is simply not true—the Court does not always apply Turner in prison-rights 
cases.”). 
 71. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. at 348 (explaining that Turner guides the consideration of 
religious freedom claims by prisoners). 
 72. Id. at 345–46. 
 73. Id. at 350–53. 
 74. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), Pub. L. No. 
106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc). 
 75. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 & n.11 (2005) (rejecting the use of the 
deferential Turner test for the compelling government interest test indicated by the RLUIPA). 
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The Court in the procedural due process realm created a test in 
Sandin v. Conner76 incompatible with Turner’s reasonable relation 
test.77 Conner asks whether the state had created liberty interests 
which did not exceed the sentence sufficiently to give rise to a due 
process claim by their own force, but “nonetheless impose[d] atypical 
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 
incidents of prison life.”78 The Court in Conner found that refusing to 
allow an inmate to present witnesses at his disciplinary hearing was 
not the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which the state 
might conceivably create a liberty interest79 and upheld the policy 
without engaging in a balancing of the Turner factors or even 
mentioning the Turner test.80 
Courts have not applied the Turner test to Eighth Amendment 
claims.81 Instead, such claims are judged using the “evolving standards 
of decency” test, which asks whether the punishment is so 
disproportionate that it offends the “evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society,”82 “shocks the 
conscience,” or is “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”83 If so, 
the punishment will be deemed cruel and unusual and thus 
unconstitutional. 
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claims have also been 
judged using a different standard, one developed in McKune v. Lile.84 
The Lile test, like the Turner test, asks whether the policy bears a 
rational relation to a legitimate penological objective, but then asks 
whether the adverse consequences that an inmate faces for not 
participating relate to the program objectives and do not constitute 
atypical and significant hardships in relation to the ordinary incidents 
of prison life.85 Thus for Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claims, 
 
 76. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 
 77. McFadden, supra note 68, at 140, 163–64. 
 78. Conner, 515 U.S. at 483–84. 
 79. Id. at 475–76. 
 80. See id. at 486 (engaging in analysis without mentioning the Turner test). 
 81. McFadden, supra note 68, at 168. 
 82. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560–61 (2005) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion)). 
 83. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 84. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 41 (2002). 
 85. Id. at 37–38. 
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the Court balances prisoners’ interests with valid penological 
objectives,86 but does not do so using the Turner test. 
Finally, the Court determined that the deferential Turner test 
would not apply to the racial segregation of prisoners in Johnson v. 
California87 and instead applied strict scrutiny.88 In Johnson, the Court 
found unconstitutional a California policy that segregated prisoners 
on the basis of race while determining their ultimate placements.89 
The Court accepted the rationale of the dissenters on the Court of 
Appeals, that Turner is inapplicable when “the right asserted is not 
inconsistent with legitimate penological objectives,”90 by applying the 
far less deferential strict scrutiny standard and striking down the 
policy.91 
Though the Court rejected the Turner test in Conner, Lile, and 
Johnson, and Congress mandated a compelling interest test instead of 
the Turner test in free exercise cases, Turner was well established as 
the standard for other First Amendment claims. But whether the 
Turner test would apply when a First Amendment rights deprivation 
was itself justified by prison administrators primarily as an 
encouragement of rehabilitation had not been challenged. The Court 
decided the proper test for deciding prisoners’ constitutional claims in 
precisely this context in Banks. 
II.  THE FACTS AND DECISION OF BEARD V. BANKS 
In Beard v. Banks, a case brought by an inmate in Pennsylvania, 
the Supreme Court reevaluated the limits of First Amendment rights 
in prison.92 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania houses its most 
difficult prisoners in the Long Term Segregation Unit (LTSU), which 
 
 86. Id. at 36–37. 
 87. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005). 
 88. Id. at 512. 
 89. Id. at 502–03. 
 90. Id. at 505 (“Judge Ferguson, joined by three others, dissented on grounds that ‘[t]he 
panel’s decision ignore[d] the Supreme Court’s repeated and unequivocal command that all 
racial classifications imposed by the government must be analyzed by a reviewing court under 
strict scrutiny, and fail[ed] to recognize that [the] Turner analysis is inapplicable in cases, such as 
this one, in which the right asserted is not inconsistent with legitimate penological objectives.’”); 
see id. at 510–12 (“The right not to be discriminated against on one’s race is not susceptible to 
the logic of Turner.”). 
 91. Id. at 509–10, 512. 
 92. Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2580 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
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is reserved for the “most incorrigible, recalcitrant inmates.”93 All 
inmates in the LTSU are initially assigned to the most restrictive 
“level 2,”94 where they “have no access to the commissary, they may 
have only one visitor per month (an immediate family member), and 
they are not allowed phone calls except in emergencies.”95 They also 
have no access to newspapers, magazines, or personal photographs, 
though they are allowed personal and legal correspondence, religious 
and legal materials, two library books, and writing paper.96 
Inmate Ronald Banks filed an action alleging that the “level 2 
Policy forbidding inmates all access to newspapers, magazines, and 
photographs bears no reasonable relation to any legitimate 
penological objective and consequently violates the First 
Amendment.”97 
Justice Breyer wrote for the plurality to reverse the Third 
Circuit’s judgment that the regulation could not be supported as a 
matter of law and uphold the Pennsylvania LTSU-2 policy prohibiting 
any access to newspapers, magazines, or photographs for inmates.98 
Justice Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment joined 
by Justice Scalia, creating the necessary majority to uphold the law.99 
Justice Ginsburg dissented and also joined in a dissent written by 
Justice Stevens,100 while Justice Alito, who wrote the Third Circuit 
dissenting opinion,101 did not participate.102 
The multiple opinions in this case reflect the Justices’ different 
positions on the appropriate level of deference to give prison officials 
in First Amendment cases. Though a majority of the Court decided 
the case solely on the basis of the first Turner factor, dismissing the 
other three factors and thereby the balancing process demanded by 
 
 93. Id. at 2576. 
 94. Id. Inmates in LTSU-2 have the possibility of graduating to somewhat less restrictive 
level 1 at the discretion of prison administrators after the first ninety days, but most of the forty 
inmates in LTSU remained in level 2 when Banks was decided. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. Restrictions on prisoners in LTSU-1 are only slightly decreased; they may receive 
one newspaper and five magazines, though personal photographs are still prohibited. Id. at 
2576–77. 
 97. Id. at 2577. 
 98. Id. at 2581–82. 
 99. Id. at 2582 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 100. Id. at 2585 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2591 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 101. Banks v. Beard, 399 F.3d 134, 148–50 (3d Cir. 2005) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 102. Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2582. 
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their presence,103 the Court’s opinions evince three distinct levels of 
deference to prison administrators. 
Writing for the plurality, Justice Breyer found the deprivation of 
newspapers and magazines a significant incentive to improve 
behavior, thus satisfying the first of the Turner factors.104 The plurality 
found that an analysis of the other factors added little to the 
determination acquired from the first factor.105 Because there was a 
“valid rational connection between the prison regulation and the 
legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it”106—the first 
of the Turner factors—the regulation was reasonable.107 Thus, the 
ultimate determination of the Turner test was made after considering 
only one factor.108 This essentially changed the test from requiring a 
reasonable relationship to requiring a rational relationship.109 
 
 103. See id. at 2579 (plurality opinion) (applying the first factor alone of the Turner test); id. 
at 2588 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same). 
 104. Id. at 2579 (plurality opinion). 
 105. Id. at 2580. 
 106. Id. at 2578 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 107. See id. at 2578–79 (“[W]e believe that the first rationale itself satisfies Turner’s 
requirements. . . . [T]he statement and deposition set forth a ‘valid, rational connection’ 
between the Policy and ‘legitimate penological objectives.’” (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 
95)). 
 108. Id. The unwieldy application of the final three factors of the test in deprivation for 
rehabilitation situations is evident through an examination of each prong. The second factor 
asks whether “alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates” 
exist. Id. at 2578 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90). Justice Stevens explained that, “under the 
deprivation theory of rehabilitation, there could never be a ‘ready alternative’ for furthering the 
government interest, because the government interest is tied directly to depriving the prisoner 
of the constitutional right at issue.” Id. at 2588 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Therefore the second 
factor is clearly inapplicable in deprivation for rehabilitation situations. The third factor, the 
“impact . . . accommodation of the asserted constitutional right . . . [will] have on guards and 
other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally,” id. at 2578 (plurality 
opinion) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90), is not necessarily implicated in the deprivation for 
rehabilitation situation because the purpose of the deprivation is not affected by the ease with 
which the right could be provided. The fourth factor, whether there are “ready alternatives” 
available for furthering the governmental interest, id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90), could be 
useful in determining the reasonableness of the deprivation. For instance, when prisoners have 
not been deprived of other privileges and when alternative deprivation remains available, 
deprivation of constitutional rights would be more likely to be deemed unreasonable. In fact, 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania made the argument that the previous removal of all other 
rights and privileges indicated the policy’s necessity to encourage good behavior. Id. at 2579. 
 109. For a discussion of the modification of the Turner test, see supra Part I.C. The change 
from the word “reasonable” to the word “rational” is not necessarily significant here. Instead, it 
is the change of the test indicated by the change of language that is important. A rational 
relationship requires that a prison regulation be justified in a valid, rational way by a legitimate 
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The plurality opinion explained that the Third Circuit gave too 
little deference to the deputy superintendent’s claim that the LTSU-2 
program created significant behavioral incentives for particularly 
difficult inmates.110 Thus, in applying the test, the plurality gave 
“substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison 
administrators[,]”111 recognizing that “the Constitution sometimes 
permits greater restriction of [constitutional] rights in a prison than it 
would allow elsewhere.”112 The plurality explained that although it did 
not accord deference for disputed facts, the views of prison 
authorities in matters of professional judgment received such 
deference.113 In practice, however, the plurality did not look beyond 
the justifications given by the secretary of the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections to determine whether those justifications 
were in fact adequate or were instead exaggerated responses to the 
state’s objective, as the Court did in Turner.114 The plurality found the 
views of the deputy superintendent to be sufficient evidence that the 
regulations “do, in fact, serve the function identified.”115 Based on this 
evidence alone, the plurality found the first factor—the only factor it 
considered, and thus the entire test—satisfied.116 In sum, the 
deference given by the plurality counted the opinions of prison 
administrators as adequate evidence in favor of the policy and would 
have required evidence contradicting those opinions to avoid 
summary judgment.117 
 
government interest. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90 (explaining that a rational connection must 
not render the policy “arbitrary or irrational” and that the government interest must be “a 
legitimate and neutral one”). A reasonable relationship requires that this rational relationship 
be balanced with the three other Turner factors. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91 (describing the 
four factors relevant in determining the reasonableness of a regulation). This distinction evinces 
the change of test that is essential to the analysis of this Note. 
 110. Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2581 (plurality opinion). 
 111. See id. at 2578 (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003)) (stating the 
standard of deference in prisoners’ constitutional rights cases). 
 112. Id. at 2577–78. 
 113. Id. at 2579. 
 114. See id. at 2578–79 (explaining that the Secretary gave justifications and they were 
therefore adequate). 
 115. Id. at 2579. 
 116. See id. (explaining that the statements satisfy the first factor and support the policy’s 
reasonableness). 
 117. Id. at 2580. This is true despite the fact that Justice Breyer also emphasized that the 
deference owed to prison officials is not so high that it is impossible for prisoners to challenge a 
regulation. Id. at 2581. 
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The level of deference granted by the plurality is best understood 
against the background of the level given by the concurrence. Instead 
of applying only a single factor like the plurality and dissent, Justice 
Thomas in his concurrence jettisoned the Turner factors altogether.118 
He instead analyzed the case using his own standard of deference, 
opining that deference to prison administrators should extend to the 
limits of the Eighth Amendment.119 He argued that the Constitution 
grants states and prison officials the ability to define and redefine 
punishment and incarceration up to the limit of cruel and unusual 
punishment set by the Eighth Amendment.120 His approach flatly 
rejects the Turner test in favor of absolute deference to prison 
administrators. Rather than assuming that “[p]rison walls do not form 
a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the 
Constitution,”121 the concurrence presumed that it is the state’s 
prerogative to determine when sentences include the extinction of 
constitutional rights.122 From this premise, the concurrence 
determined that prisoners are not entitled to any rights beyond those 
provided in the Eighth Amendment because states are free to define 
and redefine punishment to include various types of deprivations 
regardless of whether they extinguish constitutional rights in the 
process.123 This deference exceeds the grant of deference by the 
 
 118. See id. at 2582 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Both the plurality and the 
dissent evaluate the regulations challenged in this case pursuant to the approach set forth in 
Turner v. Safley, which permits prison regulations that ‘imping[e] on inmates’ constitutional 
rights’ if the regulations are ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” (citations 
omitted)). 
 119. Id. at 2582–83. Justice Thomas first articulated this standard in his concurrence in 
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003), which involved the Michigan prison policy limiting the 
total number of visitors inmates could receive and placing restrictions on who those visitors 
could be. Id. at 129–30. He argued that the policy was constitutional because the prisoners’ 
lawful sentence removed a right enjoyed by free persons, not because it withstood the Turner 
test, as the majority held. Id. at 139 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). He explained that 
the majority’s position rested on the erroneous assumption “that the Constitution contains an 
implicit definition of incarceration” and that the proper view was instead that “[s]tates are free 
to define and redefine all types of punishment, including imprisonment, to encompass various 
types of deprivations—provided only that those deprivations are consistent with the Eighth 
Amendment.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 120. Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2582–83 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Bazzetta, 
539 U.S. at 139 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
 121. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). 
 122. Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2583 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 123. Id. at 2582–83. 
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plurality124 and grants absolute deference to states and prison officials 
to entirely eliminate constitutional rights with only the Eighth 
Amendment as a limit.125 
In their dissents, both Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg 
approached the regulation, like the plurality, through the lens of 
Turner.126 Although Justice Stevens evaluated the policy to determine 
whether it reasonably connected to the penological interest of 
rehabilitation, writing in dissent for both himself and Justice Ginsburg 
he also focused on an additional aspect of the Turner test: that an 
exaggerated response to a legitimate penological objective cannot 
withstand scrutiny.127 This approach assumes prisoners retain some 
constitutional protection beyond merely that of the Eighth 
Amendment.128 The dissenters granted a level of deference distinct 
from that of both the plurality and the concurrence. They gave less 
deference to prison administrators’ justifications in their examination 
of whether the challenged deprivations were exaggerated responses 
to a prison’s legitimate interest in rehabilitation.129 Both Justice 
Stevens and Justice Ginsburg determined that a reasonable factfinder 
could conclude the responses were exaggerated, and thus the “prison 
officials [were] not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”130 Neither 
dissenter found the justifications given by prison administrators to be 
such strong evidence that the prisoner was required to refute the 
justifications for the case to go to trial.131 Instead, they agreed that the 
opinions of prison administrators alone were not enough to grant 
summary judgment and explained that under the plurality’s analysis 
 
 124. As discussed supra, the plurality counted as evidence the opinions of prison officials 
about particular prison policies limiting constitutional rights beyond what would be permissible 
for those who are not incarcerated. See id. at 2578 (plurality opinion) (“[O]ur inferences must 
accord deference to the views of prison authorities.”). 
 125. Id. at 2583 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 126. Id. at 2585 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2592 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 127. Id. at 2585 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. at 2585–91 (scrutinizing the justifications of prison administrators and finding 
the regulations to be an exaggerated response to the valid penological objective of 
rehabilitation). 
 130. Id. at 2588–89; accord id. at 2593 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 131. See id. at 2589 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that evidence contradicting the 
opinions of the prison authorities is precisely the kind of evidence that might have been 
presented at trial); see also id. at 2592–93 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that deference 
should only be granted after the facts shown are viewed in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, thus implying that this stage of litigation is not the most appropriate for 
granting deference). 
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any deprivation would be upheld as a way to improve behavior due to 
the level of deference given to prison officials.132 
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent focused on the 
procedural stage of the case before the Court.133 She argued that even 
if the deference given by the plurality was appropriate, it was 
inappropriate at summary judgment, the stage of litigation in 
question.134 She took issue with the plurality’s recognition that the 
summary judgment standard requires the Court to “draw ‘all 
justifiable inferences’” in favor of Banks, but did so only after first 
according deference to prison authorities on “disputed matters of 
professional judgment.”135 Ginsburg’s dissent explained that 
“deference should come into play, pretrial, only after the facts shown 
are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and all 
inferences are drawn in that party’s favor.”136 Ginsburg ultimately 
found on the basis of the record that “‘the logical connection between 
the . . . regulation and the asserted goal’ could be found by a 
reasonable trier to be ‘so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or 
irrational.’”137 
The variation in deference given by the Justices provides an 
important distinction in the application of the Turner test. The 
concurring argument for absolute deference stands in stark contrast 
to the dissenters’ approach of inquiring whether the regulation is an 
exaggerated response to a valid penological objective before granting 
summary judgment. The plurality granted higher deference to prison 
administrators than required by precedent through its elimination of 
three of the Turner factors. Which of these approaches should lower 
courts adopt? And even more importantly, how does the Court’s 
decision in Banks affect the theory of incarceration implicitly adopted 
by the Court? 
 
 132. Id. at 2588–89 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2591–92 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 133. Id. at 2592–93 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 2592. 
 136. Id. at 2592–93. 
 137. Id. at 2593 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1987)). 
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III.  RECONCILING BANKS WITH A THEORY OF PROPER 
INCARCERATION 
Given the multiple levels of deference granted by the Justices, 
determining how lower courts should interpret the Banks opinion 
consistently with precedent becomes a difficult task. This Note argues 
that the best approach combines the consolidation of the Turner test 
by most of the Court with the dissenters’ emphasis on ensuring that 
prison officials’ justifications for deprivations are not exaggerated 
responses to real and intractable problems faced by prison 
administration. This Part discerns a theory of proper incarceration to 
facilitate a deference analysis for lower courts and finds that a theory 
of proper incarceration is already present in the Court’s 
jurisprudence. Thus, though a theory may be necessary, it would not 
require a new creation. It then deconstructs Banks and chooses from 
among the opinions a standard that is consistent with this theory of 
proper incarceration to apply in future prisoners’ rights cases. 
A. The Court’s Theory of Proper Incarceration 
At least one scholar has argued that the Court in Banks chose to 
eliminate meaningful judicial review of prisoners’ rights restrictions to 
avoid crafting a theory or definition of proper incarceration.138 But 
what is a theory of proper incarceration, and what would indicate 
whether the Court has chosen to craft one? A theory of proper 
incarceration is simply “what a proper prison ought to look like and 
how it ought to be administered.”139 
According to Justice Thomas, for the Court to analyze which 
restrictions on rights in prison are constitutional it must necessarily 
adopt such a theory or definition.140 He explained, “The Court’s 
precedents on the rights of prisoners rest on the unstated (and 
erroneous) presumption that the Constitution contains an implicit 
definition of incarceration.”141 And when a right “need necessarily be 
compromised for the sake of proper prison administration” it is 
inconsistent with proper incarceration.142 Justice Thomas explained 
 
 138. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 125, 263–73 
(2006). 
 139. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 541–42 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id.; Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 139 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 141. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. at 139 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 142. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 541 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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that “[t]his inconsistency-with-proper-prison-administration test begs 
the question . . . . For a court to know whether any particular right is 
inconsistent with proper prison administration, it must have some 
implicit notion of what a proper prison ought to look like and how it 
ought to be administered.”143 Thus a theory of proper incarceration is 
simply a definition of constitutional incarceration. Assuming Justice 
Thomas is correct, the Court’s extensive prisoners’ rights 
jurisprudence and its determinations about which rights are 
compatible with proper incarceration indicate that it has at least 
implicitly adopted such a theory.144 
The theory of proper incarceration the Court has implicitly 
created comes from its prisoners’ rights jurisprudence. Through 
previous cases, the Court has determined that prison walls do not 
keep out the protections of the Constitution, even though 
constitutional rights may be restricted when necessary.145 Further, the 
Court has determined that those rights which are not inconsistent 
with proper incarceration remain wholly intact and may not be 
infringed even in prison,146 and that constitutional rights may be 
limited for security purposes when on balance the restrictions are 
reasonably related to valid penological objectives.147 
Thus, even if a theory of proper incarceration must exist before 
the Court can meaningfully review prison policies, previous decisions 
have already established many features of that theory. The structure 
of the theory was set in pre-Turner cases such as Martinez, in which 
the Court explained that the two ultimate factors to be balanced in 
prisoners’ rights cases were the need to protect constitutional rights 
retained by prisoners and the need for the courts to exercise restraint 
and defer to prison administrators when dealing with the complex and 
 
 143. Id. at 541–42. 
 144. See Bazzetta, 539 U.S. at 139 (arguing that the Court has adopted such a theory); 
Johnson, 543 U.S. at 541 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same); see also Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 
2572, 2575–82 (2006) (plurality opinion) (deciding the extent to which First Amendment rights 
are retained in prison); McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36–38 (2002) (deciding the extent to which 
Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination are retained in prison); Sandin v. Conner, 515 
U.S. 472, 477–87 (1995) (deciding the extent to which due process rights are retained in prison); 
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348–53 (1987) (deciding the extent to which free 
exercise rights are retained in prison). 
 145. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989). 
 146. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510. 
 147. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987). 
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intractable problems of American prisons.148 Turner built on this 
structure and set out the framework to evaluate rights-deprivation 
situations in which prison administrators could receive substantial 
deference while still allowing substantive judicial review for the 
protection of prisoners’ rights.149 
Similarly, Johnson set out a framework for use when the rights at 
issue are not inconsistent with proper incarceration.150 Though the 
Court in Johnson did not define “proper incarceration” explicitly,151 it 
illuminated some aspects of what constitutes proper incarceration 
through its decision. By finding equal protection not inconsistent with 
proper incarceration, it implied that proper incarceration includes 
equal protection rights.152 The framework of Fifth and Eighth 
Amendment rights restrictions as well as procedural due process 
claims, which were decided outside the Turner context and thus are 
inapplicable to First Amendment situations, also illuminate the 
theory.153 Turner’s analytical framework failed in Banks because the 
deprivation for rehabilitation justification did not map well within the 
Turner framework. The right in question was not a Fifth Amendment, 
Eighth Amendment, or due process right, nor so obviously 
compatible with the vision of proper incarceration alluded to by the 
Court in Johnson that the Johnson framework became applicable. 
Thus the Court was required to further develop its burgeoning theory 
of proper incarceration in Banks. 
Because case law is necessarily reactive rather than proactive, all-
encompassing theories and frameworks often develop in segmented 
ways in response to the needs posed by particular cases rather than in 
a comprehensive fashion. Thus, any decision evaluating the level of 
constitutional protection granted to prisoners would have further 
developed the Court’s theory of proper incarceration. Even refusing 
 
 148. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 424–28 (1974), overruled on other grounds by 
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). 
 149. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 85 (“Our task, then, as we stated in Martinez, is to formulate a 
standard of review for prisoners’ constitutional claims that is responsive both to the ‘policy of 
judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and [to] the need to protect constitutional 
rights.’”). 
 150. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505. 
 151. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 138, at 267–68. 
 152. See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510 (“It is not a right that need necessarily be compromised 
for the sake of proper prison administration.”). 
 153. See generally McFadden, supra note 68 (describing the different analyses that courts 
have used for prisoners’ rights claims outside the Turner context). 
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the existence of constitutional protections beyond the Eighth 
Amendment—a theory much different than one that balances 
prisoners’ rights with penological goals—further develops the theory. 
The Court’s development of this theory in Banks ultimately included 
a modification of the Turner test in deprivation for rehabilitation 
situations, despite the fact that the Court did not make this 
modification expressly.154 Not only does this modification further 
develop the preexisting theory of incarceration, but it also shows that 
accommodating deprivation for rehabilitation situations within its 
preexisting theory of incarceration was not problematic for the Court. 
Because it had already developed many details of the theory of 
incarceration, the Court in Banks did not need to create a theory out 
of “whole cloth.”155 In fact, the only necessary development of the 
theory in Banks was the level of deference given to prison officials’ 
justifications for restricting constitutional rights in the name of 
rehabilitation. Furthermore, any decision on the level of deference 
applicable in rehabilitation situations adds to the developing theory 
of “proper incarceration.” As such, rather than the Court being 
forced to choose either to retain meaningful judicial review or to 
create a new theory from “whole cloth,” only determining which 
deference level was most appropriate became essential to filling in the 
details of the theory of incarceration already accepted by the Court. 
B. The Appropriate Test and Level of Deference 
Because the Court in Banks only needed to further develop the 
theory of proper incarceration by deciding the appropriate level of 
deference to be granted when prison officials justify their actions as 
promoting rehabilitation, this Note turns to distilling the proper level 
of deference post-Banks from multiple opinions, precedent, and 
policy. 
Though there was no majority opinion, a majority of the Court 
agreed on the proper test to determine whether regulations were 
valid restrictions of prisoners’ rights.156 Over half of the Justices 
implemented a test that eliminated three of the Turner factors,157 thus 
 
 154. See Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2579 (2006) (plurality opinion) (applying only the 
first of the Turner factors). 
 155. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 138, at 269. 
 156. See Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2579 (plurality opinion) (applying only the first factor of the 
Turner test); id. at 2588 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same). 
 157. Id. at 2579 (plurality opinion); id. at 2588 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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further developing the theory of proper incarceration by altering the 
way the Court decided the extent to which First Amendment rights 
were retained in prison. To avoid rendering Turner toothless158 when 
the Court does not rely on all four factors, it must make a new 
formulation to balance the interests of prisoners with deference to 
prison administrators. The plurality nominally kept the same level of 
deference—not entire deference, but definite reliance on the 
justifications of prison administrators—without accounting for the 
loss of teeth due to the absence of the other factors,159 thus effectively 
increasing deference to the prison administrators. The approach of 
the dissenters, however, presented a way to account for that loss by 
replacing the eliminated factors with Turner’s requirement that the 
regulation not be an exaggerated response to the penological 
objective.160 The concurrence, in contrast, rejected any balancing 
whatsoever and instead favored deference over judicial review, 
endorsing absolute deference to prison officials.161 The level of 
deference granted to prison administrators will not only determine 
the outcome of most cases, it will also ultimately determine whether 
courts continue to engage in meaningful judicial review of prison 
policies. The next Sections further explore the issues of deference and 
judicial review. 
1. Absolute Deference is Not the Proper Standard.  The Court’s 
long observance that prisoners retain constitutional rights cannot be 
reconciled with the position taken by Justice Thomas’s concurrence—
that prisoners retain no rights beyond those granted in the Eighth 
Amendment—or with the plurality’s implicit movement toward that 
position.162 Thus those approaches should be rejected. The 
concurrence’s position should also be rejected on the ground that it 
eliminates meaningful judicial review in situations dealing with the 
fundamental rights of discrete and insular minorities, disenfranchised 
prisoners, and former prisoners. Finally, with the elimination of 
meaningful judicial review of prison policies, the accountability of 
 
 158. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414 (1989) (“We adopt the Turner standard in 
this case with confidence that . . . ‘a reasonableness standard is not toothless.’”). 
 159. See Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2575–82 (plurality opinion) (analyzing the regulation at issue 
under one of the four Turner factors, but not adding anything additional to the test). 
 160. See id. at 2588–89 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reviewing the regulation to determine 
whether it is an exaggerated response to a valid penological objective). 
 161. Id. at 2582–83 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 162. See supra notes 13–20 and accompanying text. 
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prison officials would decrease, possibly leading to greater abuses of 
their power, reflecting yet another reason absolute deference to 
prison administrators is improper. 
The Court has repeatedly held that incarcerated individuals are 
still entitled to constitutional protections even though those 
protections may be limited.163 Despite precedent to the contrary, 
Justice Thomas continued to argue that the Constitution, apart from 
the Eighth Amendment, does not apply in prison.164 Given the long-
standing precedent accepting that constitutional rights are retained in 
prison, for the Court to move toward the theory of constitutional 
rights advocated by Justice Thomas in his concurrence, it would have 
to overturn, abrogate, or at least undermine countless holdings to the 
contrary. Although by eliminating three factors of the Turner test the 
Court may have taken a tentative implicit step toward the doctrine 
advocated by Justice Thomas,165 it did not, and does not seem likely 
to, explicitly reject years of precedent proclaiming precisely the 
opposite of that interpretation. 
In addition to its sharp departure from precedent, the 
concurrence’s approach is undesirable because it effectively 
eliminates meaningful judicial review of prison policies. There are 
several compelling arguments for strong judicial review of, and thus 
less deference to, prison policies restricting the rights of prisoners. 
First, meaningful judicial review is justified because prisoners lack 
political power and are often disenfranchised, rendering them a 
“discrete and insular minority.”166 Under the philosophy announced in 
United States v. Carolene Products Co.,167 regulations that discriminate 
against “discrete and insular minorities” may require a “more 
searching judicial inquiry.”168 Discrete and insular minorities are those 
 
 163. See, e.g., Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2577–78 (plurality opinion) (“This Court recognized in 
Turner that imprisonment does not automatically deprive a prisoner of certain important 
constitutional protections, including those of the First Amendment. But at the same time the 
Constitution sometimes permits greater restriction of such rights in a prison than it would allow 
elsewhere.” (citations omitted)); see also supra notes 13–20 and accompanying text. 
 164. Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2582–83 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 165. See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 138, at 267 (“[T]he 
plurality subtly but surely took a large step toward the approach adopted by Justice 
Thomas . . . .”). 
 166. Gieger, supra note 2, at 1208. 
 167. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 168. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4; see Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 459 (“As 
the Court has noted, ‘more searching judicial inquiry’ is appropriate when it is a law that 
interferes with individual rights, or a law that restricts the ability of the political process to 
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that are unlikely to rely on the political process for adequate 
protection.169 Incarcerated criminal offenders fit this classic definition 
because they “constitute a despised minority without political power 
to influence the policies of legislative and executive officials.”170 
Scholars have deemed prisoners to be “the least sympathetic group of 
‘outsiders’ in our constitutional jurisprudence.”171 Because according 
to Carolene Products the Equal Protection Clause is meant to protect 
those to whom the political process is useless and criminal offenders 
are viewed as second-class citizens, legislation that places further 
burdens on this already marginalized group should be viewed with 
strict scrutiny.172 
Nevertheless, “to many people, inmates are unworthy of 
concern,”173 and “[l]ower federal courts have uniformly rejected 
heightened protection for inmates.”174 Offenders are only protected 
from legislation with no conceivable rational basis.175 This position 
may stem from the fact that, though prisoners are a discrete and 
insular minority, they are “a minority that has earned its despised 
status by causing harm to society.”176 Yet “[t]he words of the Bill of 
Rights provide a basis for judicial scrutiny of government policies that 
infringe on individuals’ rights—even if the individuals in question 
have earned their despised status.”177 Therefore even if prisoners are 
 
repeal undesirable legislation, [or] a law that discriminates against a ‘discrete and insular 
minority.’”); Gieger, supra note 2, at 1208 (“Justice Stone thus suggested [in Carolene Products] 
that where groups are repeat losers in pluralist politics not because of their minority status in a 
majoritarian democracy but because of prejudice, the judiciary may set aside its traditional 
deference towards legislation and more rigorously review it.”). 
 169. Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 459. In addition to the discrete and insular minority 
composed of all prisoners, the incarcerated individuals making up the prison population are 
primarily members of larger discrete and insular minorities. See James E. Robertson, Supreme 
Court Review: Foreword: “Separate but Equal” in Prison: Johnson v. California and Common 
Sense Racism, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 795, 843 (2006) (“At the close of 2004, white 
inmates comprised thirty-four percent of all federal and state male prisoners serving sentences 
of longer than one year.”). In fact, the “prison functions as a ‘peculiar institution’ by excluding 
large numbers of black offenders from the mainstream economic, political, and social life of the 
nation.” Id. at 844. 
 170. SMITH, supra note 21, at 292. 
 171. Pamela S. Karlan, Bringing Compassion into the Province of Judging: Justice Blackmun 
and the Outsiders, 71 N.D. L. REV. 173, 176 (1995); accord Robertson, supra note 23, at 203. 
 172. Gieger, supra note 2, at 1241–42. 
 173. Robertson, supra note 23, at 203. 
 174. Id. at 201. 
 175. Gieger, supra note 2, at 1242. 
 176. SMITH, supra note 21, at 292. 
 177. Id. 
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unworthy of greater protection, higher judicial scrutiny under 
Carolene Products is appropriate when the rights in question are 
fundamental constitutional rights.178 
Because prisoners lack political recourse to the other branches of 
government and the rights in question are fundamental rights, stricter 
judicial review should apply in prisoners’ rights situations in 
accordance with the Supreme Court’s mandate in Carolene 
Products.179 Moreover, eliminating meaningful judicial review creates 
a situation where “[t]he protections provided by the United States 
Constitution apply least where they are needed the most.”180 
A related argument contends that meaningful judicial review is 
necessary to increase accountability of prison officials.181 Because 
political mechanisms tend to be inadequate tools for prisoners, strong 
judicial review would promote both “accountability and the efficacy 
of prison policies.”182 Prison officials, though they possess unique 
knowledge of complex prison systems, are the very individuals who 
have incentive to justify harsh policies and hide individual abuses.183 
Though prisons serve an enforcement function and should already be 
accountable to the executive, the ability of prisoners to petition the 
courts, and the ability of the courts to review policies without 
automatically deferring to the justifications of prison administrators, 
provides an opportunity for courts to ensure that prison officials 
remain accountable.184 
 
 178. The Court in Carolene Products established that restrictions of fundamental rights, as 
well as those that discriminate against discrete and insular minorities, may be subject to a more 
searching judicial inquiry. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–153 n.4. 
(1938); see Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 459 (“As the Court has noted, ‘more searching 
judicial inquiry’ is appropriate when it is a law that interferes with individual rights . . . . The 
violations of basic constitutional rights by authoritarian institutions fits [sic] exactly within the 
areas where the Carolene Products footnote justifies heightened review.”). 
 179. See Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 461 (“The current presumption is against judicial 
review when there is a claim that an authoritarian institution has violated a person’s rights. This 
assumption is backwards of what it should be. The judiciary should operate from the premise 
that it has a special role in protecting individuals in these institutions.”). 
 180. Id. at 441. 
 181. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 138, at 272. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 458 (“[W]hen people are given authority over 
others abuses are likely to occur.”). 
 184. See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 138, at 273 (“[Federal 
courts] then should focus on promoting accountability for increasingly severe restrictions on 
constitutionally protected rights.”). 
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Finally, the concurrence’s approach should be rejected because 
the disproportionate power it gives prison administrators will likely 
lead to abuse. At least one legal scholar has argued that the very 
nature of authoritarian institutions leads to abuses.185 Various social 
science evidence has indicated that “the greater authority some have 
over others, and the fewer the checks or limits on behavior, the 
greater the chance for abuse.”186 This greater likelihood of serious 
abuses in such authoritarian situations provides greater necessity for 
judicial review and involvement.187 Giving extreme deference to the 
opinions of the very individuals with reason to justify harsh 
regulations—the prison administrators who adopted the policy in the 
first place and are inclined to value order in their prisons above the 
welfare of individual inmates—would merely exacerbate this problem 
and eliminate the already extremely limited ability of prisoners to 
make a case of constitutional infringement.188 Because the potential 
for abuse is already present and granting additional deference to 
prison administrators would increase this risk of abuse, courts should 
continue to meaningfully review prisoner rights claims. 
Thus, the concurrence’s position of absolute deference should be 
rejected for at least four independent reasons. First, it is inconsistent 
with countless precedent, which established that prisoners retain 
constitutional rights. Second, under Carolene Products prisoners are a 
discrete and insular minority that should receive greater, not less, 
judicial review of policies discriminating against them. Even if 
prisoners are not worthy of such greater protection, when the rights in 
question are fundamental, their restriction should still be subject to 
stricter scrutiny. Third, meaningful judicial review increases the 
accountability of prison administrators. Finally, meaningful judicial 
 
 185. See Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 441–42 (“[T]hese are the places where judicial 
review is most essential. Because of the very nature of these institutions, serious abuses of basic 
rights can occur. . . . Unfortunately, individuals in these institutions generally have nowhere else 
to turn for protection.”). 
 186. Id. at 458. 
 187. Id. The Court has not accepted this argument and has been reluctant to get involved 
with prisons because of the perceived dangers of becoming embroiled in complex prison 
administration problems. See Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2582 (2006) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (describing what he believes to be the “least perilous approach for 
resolving challenges to prison regulations”). 
 188. See Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 450 (describing how the Court ignored potential 
incentives on the part of prison administrators in a case involving the ability of prisoners to be 
free from forced injections of powerful antipsychotic medications). 
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review can lessen the abuses characteristic of authoritarian 
institutions. 
2. Movement toward Absolute Deference is Also Inappropriate.  
By simply eliminating the other Turner factors instead of modifying 
the balancing test, the plurality has given something resembling the 
concurrence’s absolute deference to prison administrators.189 Because 
absolute deference is inappropriate, eliminating factors of the 
balancing test to give nearly absolute deference to prison 
administrators under the guise of granting the same deference 
previously afforded under Turner must also be inappropriate. Thus, a 
greater modification of the test is necessary. 
Though the Turner test is ostensibly the sole test for prisoners’ 
rights claims,190 in Banks both the plurality and dissenters determined 
the constitutionality of the prison regulation based solely on the first 
of the Turner factors.191 They therefore abridged the Turner test to 
consist of only one factor in deprivation for rehabilitation situations.192 
This factor asks whether there is a there a “valid rational connection” 
between the prison regulation and the legitimate government interest 
put forward to justify it.193 When the Court only uses this first factor 
without any balancing of the other three factors, the test effectively 
changes from whether the policy reasonably relates to a legitimate 
penological objective to simply whether this first factor is met. 
The problem with this application is that by establishing a four-
factor test in Turner to determine what reasonably relates to a valid 
penological objective, the Court implicitly found that a “reasonable 
relation” to a valid penological objective was not the equivalent of a 
“valid rational connection.”194 Because reading the first Turner factor 
as merely restating, clarifying, or illuminating the nature of what is a 
reasonable relation would negate the purpose of the other three 
factors and thus conflate a valid rational connection with a reasonable 
 
 189. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 138, at 268. 
 190. McFadden, supra note 68, at 136. 
 191. Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2579 (plurality opinion) (“The second, third, and fourth factors . . . 
here add little, one way or another, to the first factor’s basic logical rationale.”); id. at 2588 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]his deprivation theory does not map easily onto several of the 
Turner factors . . . .”). 
 192. Id. at 2580 (plurality opinion). 
 193. Id. at 2578 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). 
 194. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90 (establishing that four factors are relevant in determining 
the reasonableness of the policy in question). 
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relationship to a valid penological objective, this reading must be 
inappropriate. The other factors must add something necessary to the 
analysis. If the other factors are necessary to the analysis, their 
removal without replacement must not only change the nature of the 
test, but implicitly must cause the application of the test to no longer 
determine what is reasonably related and therefore no longer be an 
appropriate formula for determining what passes constitutional 
muster. The plurality’s elimination of the balancing indicated by the 
other factors while continuing to grant deference to prison 
administrators necessarily moves the standard toward the absolute 
deference granted by the concurrence. 
An additional aspect of the Court’s incarceration jurisprudence 
reflects the inappropriateness of this movement. The Turner Court 
itself dealt with a deprivation for rehabilitation situation and did not 
merely accept the justifications of prison officials without further 
inquiring into the likelihood that they were in fact correct.195 Though 
one of the regulations examined in Turner dealt with a security 
justification—the kind of justification courts have had no problem 
tracing through the Turner factors—the other regulation was of the 
same type dealt with in Banks: a deprivation of privileges for 
rehabilitative purposes.196 In Turner, the Court found assertions by 
prison administrators that the regulation was in fact rehabilitative to 
be inadequate to withstand scrutiny.197 It did not give greater 
deference through the application of only one factor to the prison 
administrators’ justification that the policy was rehabilitative.198 It also 
did not cite to or seem to rely on evidence presented by the prisoner 
to the contrary199—as the Banks plurality opinion suggested was 
necessary to survive summary judgment.200 Instead, the Turner Court 
 
 195. See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 138, at 272 (“In 
invalidating the ban on inmate marriages, the Turner Court did not defer unquestioningly to the 
prison administration’s determination of the rehabilitative benefits.”). 
 196. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 81–82 (explaining the two regulations at issue). 
 197. See id. at 99 (“[W]e note that on this record the rehabilitative objective asserted to 
support the regulation itself is suspect.”). 
 198. See id. (“[T]he almost complete ban on the decision to marry is not reasonably related 
to legitimate penological objectives. We conclude, therefore, that the Missouri marriage 
regulation is facially invalid.”). 
 199. See id. at 94–99 (disposing of the marriage regulation without mentioning or citing to 
any evidence presented by the prisoners). 
 200. Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2581–82 (2006) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that 
“prisoners or others attacking a prison policy” may survive summary judgment by presenting 
“substantial evidence that . . . the [p]olicy is not a reasonable one”). 
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used its own reasoning to question the relationship between the 
regulation and the asserted penological objective.201 This example set 
in Turner prescribes how the Court should proceed in evaluating 
deprivation for rehabilitation claims and shows that anything 
resembling absolute deference is inappropriate. 
The plurality effectively removed the teeth from the Turner test 
by relying on and deferring to the justifications given by prison 
administrators for prison policy.202 Following the plurality opinion, the 
scrutiny given to prison policies turns entirely on the justifications for 
a policy given by the prison administrators. Thus, if a policy is 
justified by security needs, all four Turner factors will apply. If instead 
the administrators choose to justify the policy through rehabilitation 
needs alone, only one factor of the Turner test will apply, and the 
policy will face less strict scrutiny.203 Using the plurality’s reasoning, 
any deprivation of constitutional interest could be justified as 
“rehabilitative” because it would encourage inmates to behave better 
in order to regain their constitutional rights.204 Therefore the practical 
effects of the plurality’s reasoning are essentially the same as if it had 
wholly adopted the concurrence’s approach, that is, “prison officials 
from now on will be able to abridge constitutionally protected rights 
‘merely by reciting talismanic incantations’ of rehabilitation.”205 
Though the approaches implemented by the concurrence and the 
plurality should not be adopted, justifications for stricter review must 
still be balanced with the need for discipline, the preservation of 
order, and the unique knowledge possessed by prison officials 
regarding prison administration.206 These interests can be reconciled 
when courts give deference to prison officials by looking to their 
justifications and judgments for guidance, but balance those 
justifications with the nature and quality of the right restricted and 
closely examine the connection between the regulation and the stated 
penological objective. An increase in the burden of production placed 
 
 201. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 98–99 (explaining that there was not enough evidence on the 
record to show that the restriction was reasonably related to the stated goal). 
 202. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 138, at 268. 
 203. See Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2588 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that the justification 
accepted by the plurality has no limiting principle). 
 204. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 138, at 268. 
 205. Id. (quoting The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 137, 
245 (1989)). 
 206. See Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 460 (acknowledging the importance of discipline 
and order in authoritarian institutions). 
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upon prison administrators “would hopefully lead to better-supported 
policies and help eliminate hunch-based regulations.”207 The Turner 
majority’s analysis of the marriage restriction—deferring to the prison 
administration’s claim of rehabilitative benefits but not doing so 
unquestioningly—reflects this type of balancing and inquiry into the 
quality of the connection.208 This type of inquiry is precisely the type 
advocated by the dissent in Banks.209 
3. Balancing While Deferring.  The dissent’s application of the 
Turner test presents a possible modification that could replace the 
abridged Turner factors and thus create a new test for deprivation for 
rehabilitation situations. The dissent’s approach, articulated by 
Justice Stevens, does precisely what the Turner Court itself did when 
faced with a justification that a deprivation was rehabilitative: it 
analyzes the deprivation using the applicable Turner factors and 
scrutinizes whether the regulation is an exaggerated response to the 
valid penological objective of rehabilitation.210 This approach more 
accurately reflects the Turner Court’s intent to maintain a balancing 
test for prisoners’ rights and should be the approach adopted by the 
lower courts. 
Justice Stevens in his dissent carefully reviewed the justifications 
for the restrictive policy given by the prison administrators.211 Even 
absent any facts put forth by Banks, the dissent used logic and 
experience to find enough problems with the justifications put forth 
by the administrators to conclude reasonable fact finders could differ 
on their determinations about the constitutionality of the policy.212 
This application deals with the difficulty created by consolidating the 
test and replaces the other three Turner factors with another 
 
 207. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 138, at 272. 
 208. See id. (“In invalidating the ban on inmate marriages, the Turner Court did not defer 
unquestioningly to the prison administration’s determination of the rehabilitative benefits.”). 
 209. See Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2588–89 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(encouraging courts to be particularly cautious in evaluating prison policies justified primarily 
on the basis of deprivation for rehabilitation). 
 210. See id. (finding that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the regulation was an 
“exaggerated response” to the prison’s legitimate rehabilitation interest); see also Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 97–98 (1987) (explaining that the marriage regulation is an exaggerated 
response to a valid objective). 
 211. Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2586–90 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 212. Id. at 2588–89. Similarly, the Court in Turner carefully scrutinized the justifications 
offered by the prison administrators and found they were not enough to sustain the regulation. 
Turner, 482 U.S. at 99. 
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mechanism for determining the constitutionality of prison regulations 
restricting constitutional rights—a more searching inquiry behind the 
prison adminstrators’ justifications. Though the dissenters also 
dispensed with three of the Turner factors, they nevertheless 
conceptualized the application of the first factor differently and found 
the connection between the policy and a valid penological objective 
too attenuated to be constitutional.213 The dissent’s reading of the first 
factor implied a scrutiny of the government’s justifications that 
cannot act simultaneously with the high level of deference granted to 
the government by both the plurality and the concurrence.214 The 
dissenters’ evaluation of whether the policy was an exaggerated 
response to a valid penological objective standardizes this scrutiny.215 
The differences in the amount of deference given, including the 
possibility that a decrease in deference might effectively replace the 
eliminated Turner factors, present possible alternative ways to read 
the test for rehabilitative deprivation situations. 
When the dissenters agreed with the plurality that three of the 
Turner factors were inapplicable in deprivation for rehabilitation 
situations, they added another mechanism whereby the prisoners’ 
rights previously protected by balancing the factors could remain 
protected—decreasing the deference given to the opinions of prison 
administrators.216 The dissenters looked more carefully at the 
justifications of the prison administrators to ensure that they were not 
merely an “exaggerated response” to the prison’s legitimate interest 
in rehabilitation.217 Though the Turner test always contained this 
“exaggerated response” language,218 it was not necessary to separately 
examine regulations because balancing the four factors already 
ensured there was no exaggeration. When only one factor and no 
balancing is used, an “exaggerated response” analysis gives teeth to 
the test. This exaggerated response analysis would require something 
more than a mere assertion by prison administrators that a 
 
 213. See Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2588–89 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 214. See id. (explaining that to ensure that Turner continues to impose meaningful limits on 
government action, courts should cautiously evaluate the justifications put forth by prison 
administrators). 
 215. Id. 
 216. See id. at 2589–90 (refusing to simply accept justifications given by prison 
administrators without additional evidence). 
 217. Id. at 2588–90. 
 218. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987). 
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deprivation of constitutional rights will improve behavior for those 
rights to be constitutionally restricted or removed. 
Thus, the dissenters and the plurality each applied the first 
Turner factor, asking whether there was a valid rational connection 
between the prison regulation and the legitimate government interest 
put forward to justify it. Then, in addition, the dissenters asked 
whether the justification given was an exaggerated response to this 
objective. Following the example of the Banks dissenters and 
requiring prison administrators to demonstrate in some tangible 
way—beyond a mere assertion by the administrators—that the policy 
is meaningfully connected to rehabilitation before granting summary 
judgment would allow the Court to maintain the substantive judicial 
review it developed in Turner, Johnson, and other precedent without 
becoming embroiled in the complex problems of prison 
administration. In situations in which only some of the Turner factors 
are useful, giving teeth to Turner by examining prison officials’ 
justifications in a meaningful way is precisely the modification needed 
to maintain the purpose of the Turner test. This proposed 
modification of the test better furthers the purpose of judicial review 
of prison administration, follows Turner’s analysis of a deprivation for 
rehabilitation situation, and better reflects the actions of the Court in 
other situations in which facts did not fit the Turner test. 
CONCLUSION 
In addition to furthering the theory of incarceration already 
established by the Court in its previous prisoners’ rights cases, the 
mechanism used by the Banks dissenters fills the gap in constitutional 
protection created by consolidation of the Turner factors in 
deprivation for rehabilitation situations. By requiring prison 
administrators to demonstrate in some tangible way that a restrictive 
policy is meaningfully connected to rehabilitation, the Court could 
maintain the substantive judicial review it developed in Turner 
without becoming embroiled in the complex problems of prison 
administration. This approach would enable the Court to more 
critically examine the justifications of prison administrators to ensure 
those justifications are not merely an exaggerated response to a valid 
penological concern. It would also allow the Court to build on 
precedent to provide clarity to yet another aspect of this “theory of 
incarceration” without deciding questions not before it and without 
requiring it to create a new theory out of “whole cloth.” 
08__WIMSATT.DOC 4/16/2008  8:42:31 AM 
2008] PRISONERS’ RIGHTS 1243 
Judicial review of government actions protects and sustains the 
constitutional rights of all Americans. This judicial review is even 
more essential to the increasingly large portion of society which is, 
was, or will be incarcerated. As prison populations continue to grow, 
the complexities and difficulties of prison administration will only 
increase. Balancing the need for deference to those prison 
administrators on the front lines with the need for meaningful judicial 
review of prison policies has always been a challenge for the courts. If 
courts refuse to recognize the weight on the scales of either of these 
interests, the present prison system will quickly become 
unsustainable. Courts cannot act as prison administrators from afar, 
making the daily decisions of authoritarian administration, nor can 
they completely abrogate their role as protectors of the Constitution 
for those most in need. Thus the Court is compelled to strike a 
balance. For many years Turner provided that balance. Moving 
toward absolute deference and rendering Turner toothless would do 
more than undermine decades of jurisprudence. It would leave the 
system prone to abuse and eventually unsustainable, and it would 
leave prisoners with no way to protect the rights granted to them by 
the Constitution. 
